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TO YICK WO, THANKS FOR NOTHING!: CITIZENSHIP FOR
FILIPINO VETERANS
Kevin Pimentel*
In this Note, the Author uses science fiction novelist Robert Hein-
lein's model of citizenship as an analytical framework for examining
the historical treatment of Filipino veterans of World War II. The
Author Heinlein's conception of citizenship in Starship Troopers
was one in which a person can acquire citizenship only through a
term of service in the state's armed forces. Similarly, the United
States provided immediate eligibility for citizenship to World War II
era foreign veterans, but it effectively excluded Filipino veterans
from this benefit. The Author examines how the plenary power doc-
trine in immigration law, has quashed legal challenges by Filipino
veterans and created a structural imbalance that not only allows but
encourages similar inequities. The Author also notes that while
Congress has enacted remedial legislation, this delayed conferral of
citizenship without accompanying veteran's benefits is both inade-
quate and incomplete. Accordingly, the Author suggests that the
plenary power doctrine, in the context of the Filipino veterans, must
give way to textual reading of the U.S. Constitution which places an
express limit of geographic uniformity in the area of naturalization.
Drawing from the use of reparations in immigration policy, the
Author recommends that further legislative remedies be enacted to
ensure that Filipino veterans and their descendents are provided a
fair and equitable remedy for their service to the United States.
The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with
the blood of patriots and tyrants.'
As to liberty, the heroes who signed the great document
pledged themselves to buy liberty with their lives. Liberty is
* Judicial Law Clerk, Executive Office of Immigration Review, Department of
Justice Attorney Genela's Honors Program; J.D., University of Michigan Law School,
1999; B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1996. The author would like to thank
Keith Aoki, Lori Cohen, Robert S. Chang, Sumi K. Cho, Anthony Farley, Winnie Kao,
Gail M. Nomura, Stephen Sumida, and Leti Volpp.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (1787), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 356 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton University Press,
forthcoming).
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
never unalienable; it must be redeemed regularly with the
blood of patriots or it always vanishes. Of all the so-called
natural human rights that have ever been invented, liberty is
least likely to be cheap and is never free of cost.2
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INTRODUCTION
Citizenship is generally conceived of as a reciprocal relationship
between an individual and a state.3 The citizen accepts certain duties
and responsibilities to the sovereign in exchange for the protection,
rights, and privileges a state can provide. The mechanics of this
2. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, STARSHIP TROOPERS 119 (Ace Books 1987) (1959).
3. One often-cited understanding of citizenship states:
At the level of theory, it is a natural evolution in political discourse
because the concept of citizenship seems to integrate the demands of
justice and community membership .... Citizenship is intimately
linked to ideas of individual entitlement on the one hand and of at-
tachment to a particular community on the other.
Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on
Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 352 (1994), cited in Ibrahim J. Gassama et al.,
Foreword: Citizenship and its Discontents: Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National
Imagination (Part II), 76 OR. L. REv. 207, 213 (1997).
[VOL. 4:459
Citizenship for Filipino Veterans
process is most evident when analyzing citizenship acquisition
structures.4 Typically, an applicant for citizenship must demonstrate
some degree of connection to the nation before citizenship can be
granted.5
U.S. citizenship can be acquired in many ways. Birth to U.S.
citizen parents under certain conditions,
6 birth on American soil,7
and naturalization are all legally recognized methods of obtaining
citizenship. None of these methods of citizenship acquisition are
presently marred with any discrimination on the basis of race.9
However, perhaps the most arduous and deadly path to citizen-
ship-serving in the United States armed forces-has long been
denied to Filipinos.
As will be fully explicated later, Robert Heinlein's science fic-
tion novel, Starship Troopers, constructs a model of citizenship
explicitly and completely based on a reciprocal nation/citizen rela-
tionship." Before one can acquire citizenship, a term of service in the
armed forces is required. This structure manages to protect the in-
tegrity of the political process by ensuring that the power associated
with citizenship is only exercised by those who have proven them-
selves responsible through military service.
The American system of government synthesizes this protection
of the political process in a different manner. Although there are no
analogous requirements for citizenship, the power of the legislature
is kept in check by the oversight functions of the judiciary under the
Constitution.11 However, in immigration law, the plenary power doc-
trine effectively prohibits judicial oversight.' 2 This corrupted structure
of unchecked imbalance not only permits, but actively fosters the
type of mistreatment faced by Filipino veterans.
This note analyzes the historical treatment of Filipino veterans
of World War II, using Heinlein's model of citizenship as an
4. "What may the immigrant justifiably demand of the nation? What may the
nation justifiably demand of the immigrant?" Id. at 213.
5. For example, the United States requires a period of residency. See Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act of 1952, ch. III, § 316(a)-(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)-(c) (1994)
[hereinafter INA]. In addition, a loyalty oath must be sworn. See INA, ch. III, § 337, 8
U.S.C. § 1448 (1994).
6. See INA, ch. III, § 301-310, 8 U.S.C. § 1401-09 (1994).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
649 (1898).
8. See INA, ch. III, § 301-346, 8 U.S.C. § 1421-58.
9. It was only in 1952 that racial restrictions on naturalization were abolished.
See generally, INA, ch. III, § 301 et seq., 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial
review of legislative acts).
12. See infra Part III.
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analytical framework. Part One outlines Heinlein's vision of
citizenship in a future galaxy. Part Two explores the historical
context of the exclusion of Filipino veterans. Part Three presents an
overview of the plenary power doctrine in immigration law. Part
Four examines legal challenges made by Filipino veterans and
scrutinizes the efficacy of remedial legislation. Part Five examines
possible legal challenges that may be brought on behalf of the
veterans and, drawing upon reparation theory, poses various
methods of obtaining justice.
I. STARSHIP TROOPERS: No DOGS OR FILIPINOS ALLOWED
Robert Heinlein's Starship Troopers is a science fiction novel
written in the late 1950's. Heinlein's works are marked with a
deeply philosophical and sociological bent.13 For example, Heinlein's
previous novel, Citizen of the Galaxy, is an exploration of the eradica-
tion of slavery in the future.14 In fact, many science fiction novels
from this period contain explicitly political and philosophical con-
tent, as America's collective unconscious reeled from the staggering
effects of World War II and the invention of the atomic bomb."5 Sci-
ence fiction also showed signs of explicitly dealing with racial issues,
as evidenced by the works of Ray Bradbury."
Starship Troopers, ostensibly a tale of intergalactic conflict be-
tween mankind and a number of alien races, ultimately focuses on
the issue of political structure.17 By constructing a future world that
has evolved radically since twentieth century America, Heinlein is
13. See, e.g., ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, STRANGER IN A STRANGE LAND (Berkley Books
1968) (1961) (presenting an examination of American culture and society through the
eyes of a Martian).
14. See ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, CITIZEN OF THE GALAXY (Ballantine Books 1987).
15. See, e.g., WARD MOORE, BRING THE JUBILEE (1997) (showing the South win-
ning the American Civil War); FRED POHL, SLAVE SHIP (1957) (forecasting in this
novel that the Vietnamese might defeat the United States by depicting how the
Vietnamese conquer much of Asia, and can only be defeated by an alien approach).
16. See, e.g., RAY BRADBURY, And the Rock Cried Out, in THE VINTAGE BRADBURY
(1990) (depicting a future in which the 'white race' has destroyed itself, leaving only
two White people in the South American country of Colonia); Way in the Middle of the
Air, in MARTIAN CHRONICLES (Bantam Books 1990) (1950) (taking the concept of
Black nationalism to an extreme by presenting a Great Migration of all Black people
to Mars); The Other Foot, in THE ILLUSTRATED MAN (1951) (continuing the Black
interplanetary flight narrative by chronicling the arrival of the first White man on
Mars), cited in ANTHONY FARLEY, POETICS OF COLORLINED SPACE (December 7, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
17. See HEINLEIN, supra note 2.
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able to envision his own "Republic,"" a society that succeeds in
implementing his ideals of duty, honor and service through a
structural re-organization. In Heinlein's post-democratic society,
citizenship is only granted to those who serve in the armed forces.' 9
As Major Reid, military instructor of History and Moral Philosophy
in the novel explains, "[u]nder our system every voter and office-
holder is a man who has demonstrated through voluntary and
difficult service that he places the welfare of the group ahead of
personal advantage."2
Responsibility is viewed as the foundation and natural converse
of authority. Reid continues:
Since sovereign franchise is the ultimate in human
authority, we insure that all who wield it accept the ul-
timate in social responsibility-we require each person
who wishes to exert control over the state to wager his
own life-and lose it, if need be-to save the life of the
state. The maximum responsibility a human can accept
is thus equated to the ultimate authority a human can
exert. Yin and yang, perfect and equal.2'
This structure is perfect in its symmetry and simplicity. By equating
the benefit of the political franchise with the costs of engaging in
armed conflict, Heinlein establishes a social structure that values
membership by establishing a high threshold for participation and
ensures a level of competency.
Heinlein expounds at length on the superior structure of this fu-
ture society, pointing out examples of a failed and diseased
twentieth century American system of justice and political participa-
tion.2 Heinlein employs a first-person narrative to explicate his
views and advance the storyline. Yet few personal details of the
narrator's life are revealed. Rather, the majority of the narrative
focuses on the structure of the military, training conditions and in-
teractions with other recruits and superiors. Towards the end of the
18. Heinlein's Republic is in contrast to Plato's Republic, which a character in
Starship Troopers refers to as "weird in the extreme ... antlike Communism urged by
Plato under the misleading title The Republic." See id. at 181.
19. See id. at 183-184.
20. Id. at 183-84. While the film version of Starship Troopers, see STARSHIP
TRoOPERS (Tristar Pictures & Touchstone Picture 1997), featured a fully sexually
integrated military, including co-ed showers, the novel is much more modest. While
females are generally Naval officers, since they are considered superior pilots, there
is gender segregation for the most part. See HEINLEIN, supra note 2, at 203-04.
21. Id. at 183-84.
22. See id. at 120.
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novel, however, Heinlein reveals the narrator's ethnic identity as
Filipino.u3
Curiously, the movie version of Starship Troopers does not fea-
ture a Filipino protagonist. 24 Furthermore, while the novel makes
frequent references to robotic fighting dogs,2 they too were cut from
the movie. The exclusion of dogs and Filipinos in the Hollywood
version of Starship Troopers evokes images of early twentieth century
California signs outside bars and hotels that read "No dogs or Fili-
pinos allowed. 26 But the true irony of this juxtaposition between the
novel and the movie lies in the reality that while almost all foreign
veterans of World War II who fought for the United States were
granted the right to become U.S. citizens, the only group denied this
right were Filipino veterans.27
Regardless of how distasteful Heinlein's neo-fascist views re-
garding military service and citizenship may seem, there is a very
salient point behind the citizenship/military service metaphor he
constructs: citizenship is not merely a means of conferring privilege;
there are a set of duties and responsibilities concomitant with any
benefit.
In modem times, this idea has resurfaced in the debate over
welfare reform. Immigrants are depicted as parasites on the
American economy, absorbing the benefits of life in the United
States while refusing to participate in the financial, cultural, and
economic upkeep of the country." The notion of sovereignty is
typically used to advance the notion that a country can take
23. See id. at 260.
24. See STARSHIP TROOPERS, supra note 20.
25. See HEINLEIN, supra note 2, at 37 (describing the "neodogs" as "artificially
mutated symbiote[s] derived from dog stock").
26. See LAN CAO & HIMILCE NOvAS, EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
ASIAN AMERICAN HISTORY 166 (1996). See also RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A
DIFFERENT SHORE (photo reprint 1930) (1998) (picture which states "Positively No
Filipino's (sic) Allowed" posted on the door of a hotel in 1930's California).
27. See infra Part II.
28. See Bill Ong Hing, Don't Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant
Stories and Welfare Reform, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 159, 160 (1998) (describing
media image of the "wealthy immigrant professional who rips off the welfare system
on behalf of his or her foreign-born parents"); Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on
Non-Citizens' Access to Public Benefits: Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA
L. REv. 1475, 1500 (1995) (noting "stories of aliens who take advantage of one or
more forms of public benefits soon after their arrival"); Kevin R. Johnson, Public
Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and
Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1512 (1995) (recognizing that "[u]ndocumented immi-
grants have been blamed for sapping public benefits and bankrupting state and local
governments").
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whatever measures necessary to exclude foreigners.2 Yet the
converse of this idea-namely, what duties and responsibilities a
nation owes to those noncitizens who actively support a country-is
rarely discussed."°
Immigration status has often been linked to military status.
Current immigration laws create penalties for aliens based on nega-
tive military status. For example, any alien who deserts or evades
military service in the armed forces becomes permanently ineligible
for citizenship.3' Furthermore, any alien who seeks and receives an
exemption or discharge from military training or service is also
permanently ineligible for naturalization.32 These laws work to en-
sure that those unwilling to physically protect the sovereignty of this
nation will never participate fully in American society.
Clearly, the nascent mewlings of Heinlein's ideas -have been
implemented in U.S. immigration law. But the troubling aspect of
the duties/benefits paradigm arises in determining which entitle-
ments apply to foreigners who choose to fight on behalf of the
United States. Although Filipino servicemen played a pivotal role
in supporting the United States war effort in the Pacific, they re-
main unable to avail themselves of the entitlements given to other
veterans.
II. FIGHT FOR YOUR RIGHT TO NATURALIZE:
FILIPINOS IN WORLD WAR II
When World War II began, the Philippines was still a territory
of the United States.n One of the branches of the Filipino military,
the Old Philippine Scouts, was incorporated in the regular United
States Army in 1901.34 Under the provisions of the Philippine Inde-
pendence Act of 1934, the U.S. was authorized "upon the order of
the President, to call into the service of [United States] armed forces
29. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1982) (discussed infra
text accompanying notes 72-76); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889) (discussed infra notes 68-71); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) (denying procedural due process for alien undergoing deportation proceed-
ings).
30. Although legal permanent residents are generally ineligible for any federal
welfare benefits, see generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402, 110 Stat. 2105 (the Welfare Reform
Act), they are still required to pay the federal taxes that fund these benefits.
31. See INA, ch. II, § 314, 8 U.S.C. § 1425.
32. See INA, ch. II, § 315(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1426(a).
33. See Philippine Independence Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-127 § 10(a), 48 Stat.
456, 463 (1934) (granting the Philippines the right to become a self-governing nation
on July 4, 1946).
34. See Act of February 2, 1901, § 36, 31 Stat. 748, 757-58.
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all military forces organized by the Philippines government." ' In
1935, the Philippines set up a Constitution, a new government, and a
new army-the Philippine Commonwealth Army.36 In an executive
order on April 26, 1941, President Roosevelt exercised this authority
under the Philippine Independence Act to "call the then existing
military of the Philippine government 'into the service of the armed
forces of the United States.. . ., "37
Initially, the Commonwealth Army was to retain its own na-
tional integrity, "with its own uniforms, its own scales of pay, its
own promotion list, its own rations, and its own code of military
law, with Philippine Army headquarters theoretically being respon-
sible for discipline and punishment."m Over the course of the war,
the United States Army took control of the Philippine forces, and
Congress authorized $269 million to mobilize, train, equip and pay
the Philippine Army.39 The Filipinos who fought alongside American
troops often suffered heavy casualties. For example, in the infamous
Bataan Death March,40 it is estimated that between 6000 and 9000
Filipinos died.41 By 1945, at least 472,000 Filipino soldiers and guer-
rillas were under American control. 4
In March 1942, Congress amended the Nationality Act of 19404
3
to provide for immediate eligibility for citizenship for all non-
citizens who served honorably in the United States armed forces.
The legislative intent behind these amendments is clear: "If a man is
ready to fight for our country, we ought to give him the benefits of
citizenship without the normal peacetime requirements of time,
35. Philippine Independence Act of 1934, § 10(a), 48 Stat. at 463.
36. Philippine Commonwealth Act No. 1, 21 Dec. 1935.
37. Filipino Am. Veterans and Dependents Ass'n v. United States, 391 F. Supp.
1314, 1317 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (citations omitted)
38. Office of the Center for Military History, The Status of Members of Philippine
Military Forces During World War II, at 25 (June 1973) (unpublished manuscript,
prepared for the government's use in Filipino American Veterans case).
39. See Besinga v. United States, 14 F.3d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 1994).
40. In the Bataan Death March, "many of the 75,000 soldiers captured by the
Japanese were forced to march about 65 miles to prison camps. Many were killed or
died en route, and many more died later of wounds, mistreatment and disease."
Mary Schneiter, Ceremony Will Honor Filipino WWII Vets: Service Organization Seeks to
Raise Awareness of Role Filipinos Played in War, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, May 26, 1999, at
CE1. For more information on the Bataan Death March, see <http://
home.pacbell.net/fbaldie/Battling Bastards of Bataan.html> (visited September 5,
1999).
41. See Leslie Berestien, Unhealed Wounds: Filipino Soldiers from WW II are Still
Fighting to Win Full Veterans Benefits, LOS ANGELES TIMEs, July 7, 1995, at B1.
42. See At Long Last, Justice for Filipino Vets, LOS ANGELES TIMES, December 2,
1990, at M1.
43. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
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declaration of intent, and so forth . ".. 4 The 1942 amendments
provided that "any person not a citizen, regardless of age, who has
served or hereafter serves honorably in the military or naval forces
of the United States during the present war, and who, having been
lawfully admitted to the United States, including its Territories and
possessions... may be naturalized."
The United States provided for naturalization through a repre-
sentative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") for
those servicemen aliens who were not within the jurisdiction of any
court authorized to naturalize aliens.4 The Philippines, though a
U.S. territory at the time, had no court with jurisdiction to naturalize
aliens.47 Additionally, the Japanese occupation precluded the special
appointment of an INS official authorized to naturalize aliens.4
8
However, in the period between 1942 and 1945, approximately 7000
Filipino servicemen obtained U.S. citizenship outside the Philip-
pines.49 Though most received citizenship in the United States, at
least 1000 of these 7000 servicemen were granted citizenship outside
the U.S.,"o having been naturalized by special INS officials who trav-
eled on rotation throughout England, Iceland, North Africa and the
Pacific islands."1 These officials naturalized over 142,000 other non-
citizen servicemen. 2
After the Japanese occupation of the Philippines ended in
August 1945, the American Vice Consul in Manila was authorized to
naturalize aliens. 3 This authority was short-lived, as his authority to
naturalize was revoked less than two months later on October 25,
1945:94 In revoking the authority, the INS Commissioner cited the
Philippine government's concern that "a mass migration of newly
naturalized veterans would drain the country of essential man-
power, undermining postwar reconstruction efforts in the soon-to-be
independent country."' This contention has received criticism from
some scholars who view the revocation as "a seemingly obvious
political move [by the United States] to gain a stronger foothold in
44. SECOND WAR PowERs ACT, S. Doc. No. 77-2208, at 29 (1942).
45. SECOND WAR POWERS ACT, Pub. L. No. 77-507, Title X, 56 Stat. 182, 182 (1942)
(amending the Nationality Act of 1940).
46. See id. at § 702.
47. See INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 10-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. See id.
49. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 879 (1988).
50. See id.
51. See Hibi, 414 U.S. at 10 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. See Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1980).
53. See Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 879.
54. See id. at 879.
55. Id. at 879.
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the Philippines." 5 6 But in August of 1946, the INS authorized a new
official with the power to naturalize, and approximately 4000 more
Filipino servicemen obtained citizenship.57
This grant of authority was also short-lived, as Congress took
active steps to deny recognition of Filipino veterans. For example, in
1946, the First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescission Act
was passed." A rider to a supplemental appropriations act, this act
declared that the service Filipino veterans in the Commonwealth
Army performed in World War II "shall not be deemed active
service for purposes of any law of the United States conferring
rights, privilege, or benefits."'59 This rider conditioned a $200 mil-
lion grant to the post-war Philippine Army on the ineligibility of
the Commonwealth Army veterans.' A later Appropriation Rescis-
sion Ac61 provided that veterans in the New Philippine Scouts
would also be ineligible for veterans benefits in the United States.62
Thus, the only group of veterans who remained eligible were Filipi-
nos in the Old Philippine Scouts, a unit incorporated into the regular
U.S. army over forty years before World War II.6
III. PLENARY POWER CORRUPTS PLENARALLY: AN OUTLINE
OF THE DOCTRINE
To understand the standards of review involved in the legal
challenges brought by Filipino veterans against the United States, a
general discussion of the U.S. immigration system is necessary since
"[i]mmigration law is a constitutional oddity."64 The Constitution
56. Terry Ann Walsh, Military Service: Both a Path and a Bar to Naturalization, 8
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 449, 459 (1994).
57. See Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 880.
58. See First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescission Act, Pub. L. No. 79-
301, 60 Stat. 6, 14 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1994)).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See Second Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescission Act, Pub. L. No.
79-391, 60 Stat. 221, 223 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1994)).
62. See id.
63. See id. However, in 1947, Congress passed a law amending the Rescission
Act. See Act of July 25, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-241, 61 Stat. 455, 456. It granted some
Filipino veterans the benefits provided for under the Missing Persons Act. See Act of
March 7, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-490, 56 Stat. 143.
64. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congres-
sional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 255, 255. Note that the term "immigration law" refers
to the body of law governing admissions and removals from the United States. Other
aspects of aliens' rights, including government benefit eligibility, employment dis-
crimination, and tax status are generally not governed by the plenary power
doctrine. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
[VOL. 4:459
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makes few references to immigration. Article I, Section 8, clause 4,
grants to Congress the power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States."' Article I, Section 9, clause 1, states
that "[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohib-
ited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation,
not exceeding ten dollars for each Person." The paucity of substan-
tive constitutional immigration provisions led the judiciary branch
to construct their own doctrine of judicial review.67
The first constitutional challenge of immigration policy was
launched by a Chinese American immigrant, Chae Chan Ping.6
Arguing that Congress had no authority to pass an 1888 statute
which mandated his exclusion,69 Ping also attempted to avail himself
of Fifth Amendment protection against bills of attainder and ex post
facto laws.70 The Supreme Court firmly refused to extend judicial
review to the statute, noting that the only recourse Ping had was to
petition the Chinese government to "make complaint to the execu-
tive head of our government.,
71
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,72 the court expanded on this
doctrine of judicial non-interference. Ekiu, a Japanese American
immigrant, challenged an administrative officer's determination that
she was excludable.? She argued that her Fifth Amendment due
process rights required a judicial proceeding.74 The Supreme Court
rebuffed her attempt to enforce an individual constitutional right,
75
and further extended judicial deference to the political branches in
inmmigration matters.76
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547
(1990).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. The "migration" in this clause has been inter-
preted as a euphemistic reference to slavery. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION AND CMZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 187-88 (4th ed. 1998).
67. Or more appropriately a doctrine prohibiting judicial review.
68. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
69. See id. at 603.
70. See id. at 584, 589.
71. Id. at 606.
72. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
73. See id. at 652-653.
74. See id. at 656.
75. See id. at 659-660.
76. See id.
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These cases lay the foundation for the plenary power doctrine.
Expressed most clearly in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,7
the doctrine states: "[Olver no conceivable subject is the legislative
power of Congress more complete than it is over [immigration].,7'
The Supreme Court has used several extra-constitutional justifi-
cations for this doctrine, beginning with the sovereignty theory. The
sovereignty theory, based on international law, posits that every
nation has a power of self-preservation inherent in its existence,
granting it complete power to exclude aliens.79 For example, the
Court in Ping considered statements made by various State Depart-
ment officials before concluding that "[tihe power of exclusion of
foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the govern-
ment of the United States."' Subsequent cases continue to go beyond
the Constitution in defining the power of sovereignty.8
Another extra-constitutional justification is the political
question doctrine. Though related to the sovereignty doctrine, the
political question doctrine explicitly removes certain subjects from
judicial review based on foreign policy implications. 2 As the
Supreme Court has stated:
It is no new thing for the law-making power ... to
submit the decision of questions, not necessarily of judi-
cial cognizance, either to the final determination of
executive officers, or to the decision of such officers in
the first instance, with such opportunity for judicial re-
view of their action as Congress may see fit to authorize
or permit.8
In later decisions, the Court expanded this doctrine to encompass
the entire field of immigration.' Subsequent challenges to immigra-
tion police based on constitutional grounds became nearly fruitless.
Attempts at challenging unreasonable detention conditions at the
border on the basis of Fifth Amendment "due process" grounds met
77. 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
78. Id. at 339.
79. See Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659 (stating that "every sovereign nation has
the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe"); see also Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) (stating that "if [a nation] could not ex-
clude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power").
80. Id. at 609.
81. See discussion in Legomsky, supra note 64, at 273-75.
82. See discussion in Legomsky, supra note 64, at 261-269.
83. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1893).
84. See Legomsky, supra note 64, at 261-63.
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with little success. As the Supreme Court stated in United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,5 "[W]hatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is con-
cerned." 6
The claim that the plenary power doctrine implements an ab-
solutist regime over the entire field of immigration is somewhat of
an overstatement. However, the extent to which substantive consti-
tutional norms apply to immigration law is unclear. As Hiroshi
Motomura notes, the plenary power doctrine provides, "as a matter
of explicit constitutional theory,. . . that.., we cannot directly apply
mainstream constitutional norms in immigration cases. '7 However,
Motomura recognizes that the courts have made various departures
in protecting alien rights which he calls "phantom constitutional
norms"--constitutional decisions from other areas of law imported
into the immigration context which manage to create results sympa-
thetic to aliens without disturbing the plenary power doctrine.8
Nonetheless, he notes that while these phantom norms appear to
challenge the plenary power doctrine, they actually work to enforce
it. Motomura states: "[T]he tension between the plenary power doc-
trine and subconstitutional phantom norm decisions has caused
considerable damage to the process of dialogue about the future of
immigration law."' 9 Though Motomura shows guarded optimism
regarding the extent to which phantom norms can lead to meaning-
ful reform, ° the mere existence of phantom norms is disturbing on a
structural level.
This illusory erosion of the plenary power doctrine marks the
degree to which the judiciary branch has removed itself from
meaningful immigration review, as it shows an unwillingness to
establish and maintain a coherent doctrine. Because the judiciary can
point to their phantom norm decisionmaking as evidence of inherent
limits within plenary power, they are unlikely to erect any structural
changes. However, any discretionary, self-initiated reform that does
not draw on constitutional principles to create standards of review is
ultimately another method of enforcing the plenary power doctrine.
85. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
86. Id. at 544.
87. Motomura, supra note 64, at 564.
88. See generally id.
89. Id. at 612.
90. See id. at 613.
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IV. WHAT'S PROCESS GOT TO DUE WITH IT?: LEGAL CHALLENGES
AND LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
Despite the plenary power doctrine and its inherent judicial
deference to the political branches, Filipino veterans began bringing
legal challenges against the INS immediately after they were denied
immigration benefits and privileges. In 1957, Alejandro Munoz, a
Commonwealth Army veteran, brought suit in district court to peti-
tion for his naturalization. 91 The district court held that the
Rescission Act was not meant to deprive Filipino veterans of the
right to naturalize, but merely to prevent them from receiving direct
financial benefits.92 The district court cited legislative history from a
House report on the law amending the First Rescission Act to
counter the far-reaching language of the Rescission Act:
[T]he question of extending the GI bill of rights, termi-
nal leave, hospitalization, mustering-out pay, and other
veterans' benefits which American soldiers received,
were under consideration by the Appropriations Com-
mittee. From the best information now available it
seems reasonably certain that the insertion of the re-
strictive language on Philippine Army forces was made
for the purpose of excluding such personnel from the
above-mentioned veterans' rights and it was not in-
tended that the Filipino Army personnel be excluded
from the rights, benefits, and privileges of the Missing
Persons Act.93
The district court concluded that the Rescission Act "does not en-
compass rights and privileges accorded by the naturalization• . ,,94
statutes. However, later decisions denied Filipino veterans natu-
ralization rights. Subsequently, other Filipino veterans began the
process of challenging the legality of their disenfranchisement.
A. America is in the Court: Petitioning for Citizenship
The first case to reach the Supreme Court on the question of
Filipino veterans' citizenship rights was INS v. Hibi95 in 1973.
91. See Petition for Naturalization of Alejandro Florentino Munoz, 156 F. Supp.
184 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
92. See id. at 186.
93. H.R. Doc. No. 80-509, reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1469, 1470.
94. Munoz, 156 F. Supp. at 185.
95. 414 U.S. 5 (1973).
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Marciano Hibi enlisted in the Old Philippine Scouts in 1941.96 He
served under the U.S. Army and was captured by the Japanese.97 He
was released in April, 1945 and continued to serve until his
discharge in December, 1945.9' In 1964, Hibi entered the United
States on a visitor-for-business visa.9 Upon the expiration of his visa,
he filed for naturalization under § 701 of the Naturalization Act of
1940.'0°
Hibi based his naturalization petition on the grounds that the
government was estopped from relying on the statutory time limit
which Congress had attached to § 701.10' His estoppel claim was
based on the failure of the INS to advise him of his right to natural-
ize during the time he was eligible and their failure to maintain a
naturalization representative in the Philippines during the time
Filipino servicemen were eligible to naturalize.'9 When he raised the
estoppel claim at the district court level, Hibi prevailedi' Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, noting that they
"reject the government's contention that an official of the executive
branch could unilaterally nullify this Act of Congress.""' The court
granted Hibi an equitable remedy, citing Ninth Circuit precedent
that established their ability to grant citizenship when it has been
"denied due to erroneous action on the part of administrative offi-
cials.""'5
However, the Supreme Court quickly and decisively reversed
the Court of Appeals in just three paragraphs. 10 6 First, the Court
claimed that by establishing a cutoff date for claiming citizenship,
the INS was merely "enforcing the public policy established by Con-
gress."10 7 It is not clear what the Court meant by these words, as
Congress clearly mandated that "any person entitled to naturaliza-
tion under section 701 of this Act, who while serving honorably in
the military ... may be naturalized ... without appearing before a
naturalization court."1 8 Moreover, while the Court did recognize
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 6.
99. See id. at 7.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 7-8.
103. See id. at 8.
104. INS v. Hibi, 475 F.2d 7, 11 (9th Cir. 1973).
105. Id.
106. See Hibi, 414 U.S. at 5.
107. Id. at 8.
108. Second War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 77-507, Title X, 56 Stat. 182, 182-83
(1942) (amending the Nationality Act of 1940).
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that perhaps "affirmative misconduct" by the government may give
rise to a claim of estoppel, they noted that there was no such mis-
conduct in this case.109
In his dissent, Justice Douglas cited § 702 of the Nationality Act
to show that Congress intended naturalization representatives to be
available outside the jurisdiction of a naturalization court.'"" Douglas
asserted that the failure to have a naturalization officer in the Phil-
ippines in the last three months of Hibi's active service is a
"deliberate-and successful-effort on the part of agents of the
Executive Branch to frustrate the congressional purpose and to deny
substantive rights to Filipinos.""'
Despite the great precedential weight of a Supreme Court
opinion, Filipino veterans seeking naturalization continued to bring
legal challenges against the INS. In 1975, Hibi returned to court, this
time joining sixty-seven other Filipino veterans to petition again for
naturalization.'12 Bringing new evidence and separating the veterans
into three categories based on factual differences, these veterans
were able to bring their claims back into federal court.
13
The first category ("Category I") consisted of seven veterans
who mailed applications for naturalization to the United States
during active service and before December 31, 1946.114 Their applica-
tions were rejected and returned, with a letter from the INS stating
that "no purpose would be served, therefore, by the submission of
such an application to this office.""5 The court held that these peti-
tioners, unlike Hibi, were victims of the government's affirmative
misconduct and thus were entitled to naturalization.
6
The second category ("Category II") consisted of fifty-three peti-
tioners who did not take active steps to pursue naturalization before
December 31, 1946.7 Unlike Hibi's first claim, their claim was based
on the Fifth Amendment protection of due process of law."' The
Court held that Filipinos were entitled to constitutional protections,
as residents of a territory of the United States."9 The Court went on
to note that classifications based on nationality are "inherently sus-
109. See Hibi, 414 U.S. at 8.
110. See id. at 9-10.
111. Id. at 11.
112. See In the Matter of Petitions for Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans,
406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
113. See id. at 936.
114. See id. at 940.
115. Id. at 938.
116. See id. at 940.
117. See id. at 937.
118. See id. at 940.
119. See id. at 942.
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pect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."' 20 Applying this strict
scrutiny standard, the Court held that the government had not met
its burden in justifying the discriminatory conduct of not having a
naturalization officer in the Philippines; therefore, petitioners were
deprived of their due process rights and were entitled to citizen-
ship.
121
The third category ("Category III") consisted of veterans with-
out adequate evidence that they served in the military.122 They
were given ninety days to present proof of their service, and thus
naturalize.123
The INS initially docketed an appeal from the 68 Filipinos deci-
sion, but after a new administration and a new INS Commissioner
took office, withdrew it.124 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
granted the motion to withdraw on November 30, 19 77 .'25 The INS
later changed its position again and began to appeal all grants of
naturalization to Category II veterans, except for the naturalization
of veterans who filed petitions before the November 30, 1977 appeal
withdrawal date.
126
In Olegario v. United States,27 a Category II veteran, Antonio
Olegario, was granted citizenship by the District Court pursuant to
the 68 Filipinos decision. 28 The Court reviewed Olegario's constitu-
tional claim de novo, and, surprisingly, disaggregated the plenary
power doctrine.29 It notes that this case "involves the due process
constraints on the executive's authority [and] this question in con-
trast to the wisdom of a foreign policy decision is not textually
committed exclusively to the political branches." However, the
analysis moved on to whether there were due process violations
where the Court simply reiterated the plenary power doctrine,13
citing Hampton v. Mow Sum Wong" and Mathews v. Diaz.'3 The Court
used the foreign policy doctrine to justify this deference, citing their
willingness to presume the existence of "a national interest sufficient
120. Id. at 950 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-372 (1971)).
121. See id. at 951.
122. See id. at 937.
123. See id. at 951.
124. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 157 n.2 (1984).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. 629 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir. 1980).
128. See id. at 211.
129. See id. at 217.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 228-32.
132. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
133. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
SPRING 19991
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
to justify the unequal treatment of aliens or a particular class, even
in the absence of an official government statement on the issue."' 34
Consequently, the distinction between political question and foreign
affairs did little to limit plenary power.
It was not until 1984 that the Supreme Court made another
ruling on the status of Filipino veterans. In United States v. Men-
doza,"5 Sergio Mendoza, a Commonwealth Army veteran (who
would be classified as Category II under the 68 Filipinos distinction),
was granted naturalization by the District Court.'36 In granting his
naturalization, the court held that the U.S. government was collater-
ally estopped from litigating the constitutional issue of his due
process violation established in the earlier 68 Filipinos decision."7 The
Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, ruling that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in applying collateral estoppel. 3
The Supreme Court did not reach the underlying constitutional
issues, as it reversed the Court of Appeals holding that the United
States may not be collaterally estopped on this issue. 9
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided a Filipino veteran
citizenship case on its constitutional merits. In INS v. Pangilinan,'
4"
the INS appealed a Court of Appeals decision that granted naturali-
zation to 16 Filipino veterans. The Supreme Court considered
previously made arguments for naturalization and summarily re-
jected them all.14 1 First, the Court noted that none of the petitioners
were statutorily entitled to citizenship, as they filed for naturaliza-
tion after the 1946 deadlinei 4' The Court then examined the idea of
naturalization as an equitable remedy, and, after citing extensive
case law, decided that Congress alone can grant citizenship through
legislation and as carried out by the INS.1
43
Lastly, the Court discussed possible due process violations by
the INS. Unlike the District Court in 68 Filipinos, the Supreme Court
noted that a seven month presence of a naturalization officer consti-
tuted due process.'" The Court did not discuss the revocation of
naturalization authority as a component of this presence, stating that
the respondents were not entitled to "the continuous presence of a
134. See Olegario, 629 F.2d at 232.
135. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
136. See Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 1982).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1330.
139. See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 164.
140. 486 U.S. 875 (1988).
141. See id. at 882-887.
142. See id. at 883.
143. See id. at 884.
144. See id. at 885.
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naturalization officer in the Philippines from October 1945 until July
1946."
145
In attempting an equal protection analysis, the Court stated that
the presence of the naturalization officer compared favorably with
the "merely periodic presence of such officers elsewhere in the
world."'146 However, the Court's equal protection analysis was
wholly inadequate, as it did not attempt to compare the number of
non-citizen servicemen stationed in the Philippines as compared to
other parts of the world. Because such a large number of non-citizen
servicemen were stationed in the Philippines, it was not equal pro-
tection to have only the periodic presence of a naturalization officer
in the Philippines, when compared with other countries, and it did
not provide due process. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded
that none of the Filipino claims were meritorious and reversed the
Court of Appeals decision.
4 7
What was even more inadequate than the equal protection
analysis was the Court's inability to explicitly state the applicable
standard of review for such an analysis. While the Court did refer to
passages in Fiallo v. Bell14' and Matthews v. Diaz149 to support its equal
protection arguments,'150 both passages simply reiterated Congress'
plenary powers over immigration. However, the Court in Diaz up-
held a statute on the basis of it not being "wholly irrational.""' This
standard of review, far more lenient than the "rational relation" test,
is especially invidious, as it is another iteration of complete judicial
deference masquerading as a level of scrutiny."' Like Motomura's
"phantom norms," this is a "phantom" level of constitutional review.
It enables the judiciary to refrain from adequately and substantively
reviewing legislation while creating the appearance of doing so. The
Supreme Court once again declined to set an uniform standard of
review.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 886.
147. See id. at 887.
148. 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
149. 426 U.S. 67, 79-83 (1976).
150. See Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 886.
151. See Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83.
152. This haphazardly stated and arbitrarily applied standard of review is similar
to the "fantasy or pretense" standard iterated in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 590 (1952) ("Can we declare that congressional alarm about a coalition of Com-
munist power without and Communist conspiracy within the United States is either
a fantasy or a pretense?").
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B. Colonialism in the House: Rescission Act Challenges
Filipino veterans have also challenged the Rescission Act, which
stripped them of veteran status, under the due process clause. In
1994, Cornelio Besinga, a Filipino veteran, brought a constitutional
challenge against the United States for his reclassification.' 3 As the
courts had decided earlier in 68 Filipinos, inhabitants of the Philip-
pines, as residents of a United States territory, are subject to
protection under the Constitution including Fifth Amendment due
process protection as well as Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion.M Besinga charged that the Rescission Act is subject to strict
scrutiny because it erects "an invidiously discriminatory classifica-
tion on the alternative bases of race, nationality, or alienage. 15
Using precedent based on cases involving the territory of
Puerto Rico,"56 the court decided that the broad powers granted to
Congress based on the Territory Clause are inconsistent with any
application of heightened judicial scrutiny to legislation regarding
157the territories. Applying a rational relation test, the court upheld
the constitutionality of the rider.
In finding that the rider was rationally related to its purposes,
the Besinga court applied three factors articulated in the analogous
Puerto Rico cases."15 In Torres, for example, the denial of Social Secu-
rity payments to residents of Puerto Rico was challenged on two
grounds: as violating the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment, and as an impermissible limitation on the fundamental
right to travel protected by substantive due process under the Fifth
Amendment."9 The court cited three factors in its rational relation
inquiry: (1) Puerto Rican residents were not entitled to SSI benefits
since they were part of a unique tax structure and did not pay into
the federal treasury; (2) the costs of paying SSI benefits would be
extremely great-an estimated 300 million a year; and (3) inclusion
into the SSI program might disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.160
153. See Besinga v. United States, 14 F.3d 1356 (9th Cir. 1994).
154. See In the Matter of Petitions for Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans,
406 F. Supp. 931, 942 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
155. Besinga, 14 F.3d at 1360.
156. See, e.g., Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (holding constitutional, under
rational basis review, a congressional statute treating Puerto Rican residents different
from residents of states); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding that, for
provisions of the Social Security Act, Congress' definition of residence in the United
States as being limited to the 50 states and the District of Columbia did not interfere
with the constitutional right to travel).
157. See Besinga, 14 F.3d at 1360.
158. See Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652; Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7.
159. See id. at 3-4.
160. See id. at 5 n.7.
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The court analogized Besinga's situation to the facts in Torres,
noting that "[tihese factors are present here ... [and] that they are
dispositive ... .,,161 After considering that Besinga, as a U.S. citizen,
did pay into the federal treasury and that any benefits paid to him
would not disrupt the Philippine economy, the court invalidated the
first and third factors. 2 However, even the invalidation of most or
even all of the Torres factors seemed trivial to the court, as the they
decided that "[niothing in Torres or Rosario suggests that a chal-
lenged statute must satisfy all, or a majority, of the three Torres
factors."'6' The court's gloss on the Torres factors serves as simply
another subtle iteration of the plenary power doctrine. By establish-
ing a "phantom" test that is meaningless to the outcome of the case,
the court failed to exercise any real form of judicial review.
The Besinga court did articulate other factors. For instance, the
court noted that the United States was concerned that the payment
of benefits to hundreds of thousands of Filipinos would be perceived
as a threat to the sovereignty of the soon-to-be-independent Philip-
pine Government.i6 Moreover, the payment of benefits was
perceived to be prohibitively expensive.
The first factor did not seem plausible. If the United States was
truly concerned with threats to sovereignty, placing the entire Phil-
ippine military under its control during World War II seems
inconsistent with that concern. In any case, this threat to sovereignty
argument did not prevent the United States from conferring veter-
ans benefits to members of the Old Philippine Scouts. However, in
denying benefits to Besinga, the Court distinguished him, a veteran
of the Commonwealth Army, from the Old Philippine Scouts, who
were receiving full veterans benefits.16 The Court noted that there is
no violation of equal protection because the Old Philippine Scouts
were "more integrally a part of the United States armed forces."167
The second factor seemed more plausible. As the court in
Quiban v. Veterans Administration,'6' another case involving a Fili-
pino veteran challenging the Rescission Act, noted, "the costs of
extending full veterans' benefits to veterans of the [Philippine
Commonwealth Army] would approach 2 billion dollars annually,
for a substantial period of time." 169 However, given the relatively
161. Besinga, 14 F.3d at 1361.
162. See id. at 1363.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 1361.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 1362.
167. Id.
168. 928 F.2d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
169. Id. at 1161.
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small number of veterans surviving today, this factor must be
re-examined.
As the outcome in Besinga shows, it is clear that constitutional
challenges to the Rescission Act will not be upheld, since heightened
judicial scrutiny is unavailable for these cases controlled by the Ter-
ritory Clause of the Constitution. Despite the fact that the Rescission
Act facially discriminates on the basis of race, Besinga clearly illus-
trates the court's unwillingness to apply heightened scrutiny or any
form of substantive judicial review in these cases.
C. Too Little, Too Late: Remedial Legislation
Subsequent to the Pangilinan decision, Congress decided to
amend the immigration laws to provide for the naturalization of
Filipino veterans. Section 405 of the 1990 Immigration Act allowed
Filipino nationals who served on active duty during World War II to
apply for citizenship between May 1, 1991 and May 1, 1993, and also
allowed for the conferral of citizenship posthumously.' 70 The Act
was later amended to extend the deadline for naturalization until
February, 1994. Approximately 28,000 Filipino veterans were natu-
ralized pursuant to the 1990 Act.
171
While the legislation seems just, it is only in the face of blatant
injustice and discrimination that one can be satisfied with this result.
First, the fifty-year waiting period between World War II and 1991
resulted in the death of many Filipino veterans. Many of these veter-
ans would have taken advantage of the offer to naturalize if
extended earlier.
Furthermore, the conferral of posthumous citizenship is com-
pletely inadequate. Pursuant to the 1990 amendments to the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, aliens served honorably in the
armed forces during periods of hostilities are eligible for citizenship
if their deaths were a result of that service. 17 As President Reagan
noted when he proposed the legislation, "we cannot repay these men
for their sacrifice, valor or patriotism; but it is only right that we
bestow on each of them our Nation's highest honor: American citi-
zenship."173 Despite these noble intentions, the legislation does little
170. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, ch. 405, 104 Stat. 4978
(1990) (amending scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
171. See Loida Nicholas Lewis, Perspective on Veterans: Make Peace with Filipinos
who Served U.S., LOS ANGELES TIMES, August 22, 1997, at B9.
172. See INA, ch. III, § 329A, 8 U.S.C. § 1440-1.
173. Immigration Benefits Based on U.S. Military Service: Hearings on H.R. 150, H.R.
478, H.R. 525, H.R. 639, H.R. 1286, H.R. 1306, H.R. 1313, H.R. 2304, and H.R. 2407
Before the Subcomm. On Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 49-51 (1989).
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to confer any semblance of citizenship to these veterans. Obviously,
the dead veterans do not have the right to vote or immigrate to the
United States. More importantly, any surviving family members are
denied any chance to benefit from the dead veteran's citizenship, as
citizens must be alive to petition for their family to immigrate to the
United States.1'7 As the application form for citizenship reads, citi-
zenship does "not confer any benefits nor make applicable any
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act to the surviving
spouse, parent, son, daughter, or other relative of the decedent." "
This nominal citizenship hardly seems to reflect "our Nation's high-
est honor." Rather, it creates a second class citizenship that mocks
the alien veteran's sacrifice.
Beyond the problem of dead veterans lies the inadequacy of
conferral of citizenship under Section 405 for the veteran. One im-
portant right that citizens have is the ability to get permanent
residence for their immediate family.176 While a veteran would be
able to immediately bring his wife and children with him to the
United States, immigration law is structured such that any children
over the age of 21 must petition to come to the U.S.' 77 As of February
1998, it would take approximately twelve years for a Filipino vet-
eran to immigrate his unmarried son or daughter over the age of
21. 78 Due to the delay, Filipino veterans are now unable to enjoy the
full benefits of citizenship that they would have if they were natu-
ralized fifty years ago. Furthermore, Filipino veterans are still
ineligible for veteran's benefits under the 1946 Rescission Act, unless
they are dead, maimed or separated from active service for physical
disability. 79 Without these veteran's benefits, many of the surviving
Filipino veterans who were naturalized under Section 405 find
themselves unable to find gainful employment because of their age,
and survive solely on Supplemental Security Income and Food
Stamps rather than on the more generous veterans' benefits they
have earned through their tour of duty for the United States.
174. See INA, ch. II, § 201(b) (2) (A), 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151, 1153.
175. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION ADMINISTRATION FORM N-17, NATURALIZATION REQUIREMENTS
AND GENERAL INFORMATION, at 32.
176. See INA, ch. II, § 201(b) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1151.
177. Under INA §203(a), unmarried sons and daughters over the age of 21 are not
considered "children" within the rubric of immediate family. See INA, ch. I, § 101(b)
(1), 8 U.S.C. 1101 (statutory definition of "child").
178. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 66, at 296. While it is certainly possible that
a WWII veteran would have a child under the age of 21, this scenario is extremely
unlikely.
179. See First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescission Act, supra note 58,
at 14.
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This state of affairs has led to increasing political activism by
Filipino veterans themselves. In June of 1997, more than 40 Filipino
veterans began a sit-in at MacArthur Park in Los Angeles to bring
attention to their plight.' Many of the veterans chained themselves
to a statue of General MacArthur and began a lengthy hunger
strike.18' Twice in the summer of 1997, hundreds of Filipino veterans
marched to the White House in a re-enactment of the Bataan Death
March in order to protest the current administration's failure to
recognize their veteran status.8 1 In April, 1998, 14 Filipino veterans
chained themselves to General MacArthur's statue again in order
to support legislative efforts to grant veterans' benefits." In fact,
since 1993, legislation designed to finally grant these entitlements
to Filipino veterans has been proposed every year. To date, none of
these efforts have been successful."
V. THE OFFSPRING OF THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS: LIMITING PLENARY
POWER AND REPARATIONS THEORY
The plight of Filipino veterans of World War II continues to this
day. In order to explicate any meaningful legal moral from their
situation, the legal basis for the continued denial of citizenship must
be examined critically.
A. The Phantom Constitutional Menace: Possible
Restrictions on Plenary Power
Since its inception, the notion of Congress' plenary power over
immigration, which gives Congress a wide range of discretion based
on non-delineated powers, has been repeatedly attacked. For
example, the foundations of the plenary powers-especially the
sovereignty doctrine, in which the courts have relied on
international law concepts of sovereignty to justify a lack of judicial
review-has also been harshly criticized. As Justice Brewer
maintained in an 1893 dissent:
180. See Joe Mozingo, Filipino Veterans Chain Selves to Statue in Protest, Los
ANGELES TIMES, June 17, 1997, at B1.
181. See id.
182. See Gene Kramer, Philippine-American Vets March (visited Sept. 5, 1999)
<http: / /www.filipinocenter.com/vets/vets2ndmarch.html>.
183. See Filipino Veterans Press for War Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 1998, at A17.
184. See Veterans' Equity: Now or Never, ISULONG MOVE FoRWARD, Oct. 1998, at 1
(visited Sept. 5, 1999) <http://www.filcra.org/newsletter/indexl.html>.
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It is said that the power here asserted is inherent in
sovereignty. This doctrine of powers inherent in
sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous.
Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and by
whom are they to be pronounced? Is it within
legislative capacity to declare the limits? If so, then the
mere assertion of an inherent power creates it, and
despotism exists.1''
Other commentators have expanded on this critique. Most notably,
Stephen Legomsky argued that expanding the sovereignty doctrine
to justify "preclusion of judicial review for compliance with those
constitutional limitations protecting individual rights is a non-
sequitur."186 Moreover, even if we accept that the sovereignty
doctrine has its foundation in eighteenth century international law,
there has been a constant evolution of international law since that
era. 187 Current customary international law mandates a recognition
of human rights,'8 as evinced by the proliferation of human rights
treaties and custom.189
Similarly, the political question doctrine, in which all immigra-
tion decisions have been broadly characterized as political questions
and consequently taken outside the scope of judicial review,"190 has
also been criticized. While it is obvious that certain immigration
decisions are "so inextricably bound up with foreign policy that a
court should not intrude,"'19' "it ignores reality to hold that every
provision concerned with immigration, as applied to every fact
situation it might encompass, is so intimately rooted in foreign pol-
icy that the usual scope of judicial review would hamper the
effective conduct of foreign relations."'92 Legomsky suggests the use
of the political question test, established by the Supreme Court in
Baker v. Carr,193 which mandates "a discriminating inquiry into the
precise facts and posture of the particular case.' 94
185. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
186. Legomsky, supra note 64, at 274 (citing LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 25 (1972)); see also Richard Hahn, Note, Constitutional Limits on the
Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 970-71 (1982).
187. See Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L.
REV. 965, 1004.
188. See id. at 1011 (noting that the modem structure of international law
"imposes generally agreed upon positive limitations on nations' sovereignty").
189. See generally id. at 1015-1030.
190. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
191. Legomsky, supra note 64, at 262.
192. Id.
193. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
194. Id. at 217.
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Legomsky also postulates that external social and political
factors led to the development of the plenary power doctrine.195 For
instance, the cases that formed the foundation of plenary power all
involved Asian immigrants between 1889 and 1902.196 The presence
of Anti-Asian animus in American society at that time is well
documented.197 Strikingly, even members of the Supreme Court did
not hesitate to reveal their distaste for Asians. 98 Similarly, the
"second coming" of plenary power in the 1950s occurred at a time of
anti-Communist hysteria."9 Here, exclusion and deportation cases
focused on removing those with ties to Communism, however weak
the link.2°° The most recent revival of plenary power came at a time
when anti-Arab sentiment ran high.201 In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee,0 2  the Court interpreted a recent
immigration statute to be "aimed at protecting the Executive's
discretion from the court-indeed, that can fairly be said to be the
theme of the legislation., 20 3 The Court held that "an alien unlawfully
in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective
enforcement as a defense against his deportation.', 204 In so doing,
without explicitly mentioning the plenary power, the Supreme
Court again affirmed the doctrine.
B. What's Uniformity Got to Do with it?: Constitutional
Limitations on Plenary Power
Irrespective of the plenary power doctrine, the Constitution
contains a Naturalization Clause which grants to Congress the
power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uni-
form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
195. See Legomsky, supra note 64, at 278-79 and 286-95.
196. See id. at 289 n.174.
197. See id. at 288; see also ANGELO ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 21-22 (1998).
198. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893) ("It is true
this statute is directed only against the obnoxious Chinese; .... ); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 561 ("There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit
those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States ... I allude to the Chi-
nese race.").
199. See Legomsky, supra note 64, at 289-90.
200. See id. at 290 n.182.
201. See ARAB-AMERICAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, 1991 REPORT ON
ANTI-ARAB HATE CRIMES: POLITICAL HATE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS
9 (1992).
202. No. 97-1252, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1514 (Feb. 24, 1999).
203. Id. at *27.
204. Id. at *29.
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States."25 This clause appears to expressly delegate a naturalization
power to Congress and apply a limit on that power by mandating
uniformity. Consequently, despite the plenary power doctrine, it
would seem that the judiciary could legitimately review legislative
decisions and decide on the constitutionality of such matters. Unfor-
tunately, the extent to which a "law of Naturalization" must be
"uniform" is very limited. Until the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act,
naturalization was restricted to "aliens being free White persons,
and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African de-
scent."2 6 The focus on African Americans in naturalization and the
specific omission of Asian Americans from eligibility subsequently
thrust them into judicial challenges over the naturalization laws.
In 1922, a Japanese American man who met the requirements of
naturalization attempted to argue that he was a free White person,
under the terms of the statute.2w The court decided that he was not
"white," as the statute referred not to skin color, but to racial ori-
gins.08 A few months later, in United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind,29 a
naturalized South Asian veteran of World War I was brought to
court to be denaturalized.21 The Court reasoned that despite Thind's
Aryan ethnicity, he clearly was not "white" in terms of skin color.21'
After this decision, several dozen other South Asian Americans
found their citizenship being challenged and canceled.2 2
It was not until 1942 that Asian Americans attempted to
construe the language of "uniform law of Naturalization" to apply to
all racial categories.21 ' Kharaiti Ram Samras was a South Asian
American legal permanent resident who applied for naturalization
in 1940, and his petition was denied "on the ground of racial
ineligibility. '214 He argued that the Naturalization Clause meant
"uniformity as to all races and not uniform geographically
throughout the United States., 21 He further argued that a racially
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
206. Kharaiti Ram Samras v. United States, 125 F.2d 879, 880 (9th Cir. 1942).
207. See Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
208. See id. at 195-196.
209. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
210. See id. at 207.
211. See id. at 208-209.
212. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1241, 1292 n.252 ("By
September 1926, forty-three South Asians had had their citizenships annulled while
the others were to battle in the courts for years to come.") (citing Sucheta Mazumdar,
Race and Racism: South Asians in the United States, in FRONTIERS OF AsIAN AMERICAN
STUDIEs 30 (Gail M. Nomura et al. eds., 1989).
213. See Samras v. United States, 125 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1942).
214. Id. at 880.
215. Id.
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biased naturalization statute was neither necessary nor proper216
under the Necessary and Proper Clause,217  and that the
naturalization statute, by virtue of being a "manifestly and grossly
unreasonable, irrational, illogical, arbitrary, capricious and
discriminatory classification based on color,1 218 violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2" The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument. The court acknowledged that certain actions
of Congress that are considered political-such as the war power
and the exclusion and deportation of aliens--cannot be subject to
judicial review. ° While there is no direct mention of the plenary
power, the court cited Nishimura Ekiu.221 The court distinguished the
power over naturalization as expressly granted in the Constitution
and separate from other aspects of immigration law, but then
characterized the nature of naturalization as inherently political.2M In
doing so, the court managed to bring the Naturalization Clause
within the plenary power, despite an express limitation placed on
Congress' power through the Naturalization Clause. This circular
argument is both confusing and unjust.
As discussed above, one of the sources of the plenary power
doctrine was the Naturalization Clause, but the lack of express
power to regulate immigration, and the need to draw from both the
sovereignty and political question doctrines formed the basis of
judicial deference in the cases creating and strengthening the ple-
nary power doctrine. In Kharaiti Ram Samras, the court willingly
ignored any responsibility for constitutional review of an expressly
granted power based on that doctrine. The court continued, spout-
ing idle dicta, asserting that "assuming that we may discuss the
questions argued, we think none of [Ram Samras'] assertions are
sound .... It is obvious that the statute was one which in the judg-
ment of Congress would effect a 'uniform Rule of Naturalization',
otherwise it would not have been passed."M But if this argument is
taken to its logical outcome, one could assume that even if Congress
created a system of naturalization that was not geographically uni-
form (perhaps easing residency requirements for becoming a citizen
216. See id. at 880-81.
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (stating that Congress shall "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers").
218. Samras, 125 F.2d at 881.
219. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
220. See Samras, 125 F.2d at 881.
221. See id. (citing Nishimura Ekiu for the proposition that "the power [over natu-
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if one applied in Virginia, or eradicating naturalization in the state
of New Jersey), the court would be unable to rule on the constitu-
tionality of such a law. Clearly, the judiciary exists to ensure that the
legislature complies with the Constitution and the express limitation
on power must be judicially reviewed and enforced. 4
Samras' suggestion that uniformity applied to race and not ge-
ography was not accepted by the court. It construed the word
"uniformity" similarly to the line of cases about "uniformity" in
bankruptcy law. The Constitution mandates "uniform Laws on the
Subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Since 1902,
the Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to refer to geographic
uniformity only. In Hanover National Bank v. Moyes,26 the Court was
faced with a constitutional challenge to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
Since this federal law prescribed differential bankruptcy exemptions
depending on state law, Moyes challenged the constitutionality of
the statute by virtue of its non-uniform nature.27 The Court held that
geographic uniformity does not preempt state law and any other
form-of uniformity, such as personal uniformity, is irrelevant.2
However, analogizing "uniformity" in naturalization law to
"uniformity" in bankruptcy law is problematic. 229 A close textual
analysis of the Constitution illustrates that this analogy is not war-
ranted. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, states that Congress shall have
the power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States." 23 The clause "throughout the United States" modifies only
the second phrase "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies"
and the comma separating the two phrases suggests that the clause
"throughout the United States" may not modify the Naturalization
Clause.
Beyond this nearly specious textual analysis, naturalization
presents significantly unique problems compared to other fields.
Bankruptcy and import/export taxes are domestic transactions that
can only be completed within the United States. As the circum-
stances facing the Filipino veterans after World War II show,
naturalization can take place abroad as well. While this situation
may not have been within the contemplation of the framers of the
224. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
226. 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
227. See id. at 182-83.
228. See id. at 188-89.
229. Analogizing "uniformity" in naturalization law to any other requirements for
uniformity mentioned in the Constitution, such as import and export taxes, is
equally problematic.
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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Constitution, we must attempt to interpret their mandate of
geographic uniformity in this context.
One interpretation would be to strike down all forms of natu-
ralization that do not take place in the United States. However, this
view flies in the face of congressional intent, not only with regard to
legislative history in enacting the 1942 amendments to the National-
ity Act of 1940, but also with regard to subsequent legislation that
makes clear the intent to grant citizenship to foreign veterans.231
Another interpretation would be to require geographic uniformity
throughout areas in which foreign servicemen were stationed. While
this proposition could be deemed too costly in terms of appointing
INS officials in all areas of conflict, it is the only reasonable interpreta-
tion of the uniformity requirement that preserves both congressional
intent and constitutionality. One final possible interpretation would be
to require servicemen to apply for naturalization in the United States
or through the mail, as the first category of veterans in 68 Filipinos
did. Yet this would not be a reasonable interpretation of the 1942
amendments which mandated floating INS representatives in areas
of conflict.232
In any case, the constitutional mandate of geographic uniform-
ity seems fairly clear. Because it is an express limit on the power
granted to Congress by the Constitution in the area of naturalization,
the plenary power doctrine should not apply. Moreover, this power
cannot be considered a political question, as it pertains to adminis-
trative access to immigration and not substantive foreign policy or
matters of national security.
In fact, a recent case regarding grants of naturalization to
veterans involved in the Grenada conflict supports this theory. In
Reyes v. Immigration and Naturalization Services,233 a Filipino veteran
challenged a geographic restriction on an executive order relaxing
naturalization standards for veterans2---ari order very similar to the
1942 amendments to the Nationality Act. Section 329 of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act provides the President the
authority to relax naturalization standards for veterans for a certain
time period:
Any person who, while an alien or noncitizen national
of the United States, has served honorably in an active-
duty status in the military, air, or naval forces of the
United States during... [a] period which the President
231. See discussion supra at notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
232. See discussion supra at notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
233. 910 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1990).
234. Executive Order No. 12,582, 52 C.F.R. 3,395 (1987).
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by Executive Order shall designate as a period ... [of]
armed conflict with a hostile foreign force ... may be
naturalized under this section31
However, when President Reagan issued the order, he specified not
only a time period in which eligible veterans must have served, but
a geographic restriction limiting eligibility to those serving in "the
islands of Grenada, Carriacou, Green Hog, and those islands adja-
cent to Grenada in the Atlantic Seaboard where such service was in
the direct support of the military operations in Grenada."''  Reyes
was not stationed in any of the aforementioned areas, but he was in
active service during the specified time period.3 7 Reyes argued that
geographic restrictions were an impermissible exercise of executive
power, and the court agreed with him.m Ironically, the court de-
cided to strike the entire order rather than allowing him to
naturalize, reasoning that since there was no severability clause or
any way to effectuate the order without granting naturalization to
all veterans who served in that time period, the executive order was
entirely void.39
Since this case dealt with an executive order, it is not clear
whether Congress itself could place a geographic restriction on a
statute to a similar effect. If Congress did place such a geographic
restriction on naturalization, it would appear to be in conflict with
the uniformity required by the Naturalization Clause.240 Although
this aspect of immigration law has not been adjudicated, that type of
geographic restriction seems clearly unconstitutional on its face.
Regardless, there were no geographic restrictions placed in the
1942 amendments to the Nationality Act of 1940, and a strict consti-
tutional interpretation would permit the Court to allow veterans
eligible at the time to apply again for naturalization. Since the Su-
preme Court has made it clear that federal courts cannot grant
naturalization,241 any legal challenge must incorporate a theory of
equity that will allow courts to award monetary damages to the
Filipino veterans. Unfortunately, any system of reparations will
likely come from the legislature and not from the judiciary. While
Congress must be applauded for allowing the veterans the right to
naturalize in 1990, citizenship alone is clearly inadequate. 242
235. INA, ch. III, § 329, 8 U.S.C. § 1440.
236. Executive Order No. 12,582, 52 C.F.R. 3,395 (1987).
237. See Reyes, 910 F.2d at 612.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 613.
240. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
241. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 884 (1988).
242. See discussion supra at Part W.C.
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C. With Plenary Power Comes Plenary Responsibility: Reparations
The United States has traditionally been reluctant to acknowl-
edge or make reparations for harms it inflicted upon racial
minorities. While slavery has forever perverted and delegitimized
the social, political, and economic structure of the United States,
attempts at receiving a modest apology for the disdainful institution
have been met with overwhelming opposition.243
On August 10, 1988, President Reagan signed the Civil Liberties
Act of 1988.24 The Act was designed to do three things: 1)
"Acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, reloca-
tion, and internment of United States citizens and permanent
resident aliens of Japanese ancestry during World War II;" 24 2)
"[a]pologize on behalf of the people of the United States for the
evacuation, relocation, and internment of such citizens and perma-
nent resident aliens;, 246 and 3) "make restitution to those individuals
of Japanese ancestry who were interned . 247 The Act authorized
payments of $20,000 to individuals who were interned.24 While the
reparations movement has been criticized as a failed attempt to alter
the "fundamental realities of power" and for fostering "illusions of
change" that are unwarranted given continuing American racism,24'
the success of the redress movement was the creation of a historical
moment where the United States acknowledged racism and made an
attempt to remedy it.
In the context of immigration, Congress has been able to exer-
cise this power of reparation. The plenary power doctrine, which
grants the legislative branch complete control over the immigration
system unfettered by judicial review, gives a potentially unlimited
scope to such immigration reparations programs. This broad scope
for reparations can be seen in the current immigration laws, which
underwent a radical shift in the late 1980s away from the values of
family reunification and employment necessity established in 1965.
243. See Chris K. lijima, Political Accommodation and the Ideology of the "Model
Minority": Building a Bridge to White Minority Rule in the 21st Century, 7 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 4-6 (1998).
244. Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1994)).
245. Id. at 903.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 906.
249. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress
and Reparations, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 223 (1992).
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In 1986, the NP-5 program was implemented. ° It provided
5000 special visas to countries "adversely affected" by existing
immigration law.51 "Adversely affected" meant that the average
annual rate of immigration to the United States during the period
from July 1, 1966 to September 30, 1985 was less than the average
annual rate of immigration to the United States during the period
12from July 1, 1953 to June 30, 1965. This standard excluded most
Central and South American countries and all Asian countries
except for Japan. Moreover, these visas were not dependent on the
applicant having shown a connection to the United States via family
relations, employment opportunity, or refugee status; rather, they
were distributed on a first come first serve basis. Although the NP-5
program has been amended over the last decadem its basic structure
remains relatively intact.
These reparations for "adversely affected" countries is problem-
atic on two levels. First, unlike the well-documented restrictions on
Asian immigration prior to 1965,2 the 1965 amendments to the Im-
migration and Nationality Act did not place any discriminatory
immigration limits on the aforementioned "adversely affected"
countries. In fact, the 1965 amendments constituted the first time the
U.S. had an immigration system without national origins quotas or
explicit restrictions on immigration from certain countries.2 "5 Out-
right exclusion and exceedingly low numerical limits placed on
Asian immigration prior to 1965 have been well documented.2 Yet
almost all Asian countries were ineligible for NP-5 visas. Second,
even if there existed a class of adversely affected potential irmi-
grants, this program did nothing to identify any class of individuals
harmed by the 1965 provisions. It merely distributed visas to any
nationals of the aforementioned countries.
250. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986).
251. See id.
252. See 22 C.F.R. § 43.2 (1988).
253. The NP-5 program has since been slightly modified and established as a
permanent set-aside known as the "diversity visa". Approximately 55,000 visas each
year are distributed in a lottery system to countries that have not immigrated a
certain number of people in the last 5 years.
254. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (curtailing most Chinese
immigration); Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (establishing a "barred
zone" which prevented nearly all immigration from Asia).
255. See discussion supra note 254 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Jan C. Ting, "Other Than a Chinaman": How U.S. Immigration Law
Resulted From and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4
TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 301 (1995); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Strong-
hold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1998); ANCHETA, supra note 197, at 86-90.
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Even though the NP-5 program does not specifically help
Filipino veterans in their battle over naturalization rights, this form
of immigration reparation may bode well for Filipino veterans, since
surviving veterans and families of deceased veterans are an easily
identifiable class. Furthermore, the broad nature of the NP-5
program, which conflated national identity with individual
nationals, suggests that remedies may exist for veterans who died
without issue. The remedial NP-5 visas are not granted only to
actual descendents of those who were "adversely affected" by
previous immigration laws. Rather, they are freely distributed to
anyone from specific countries. Similarly, the United States can
provide the Philippines with additional visas in response to how
Filipino veterans were "adversely affected" by their disen-
franchisement.
Further legislative remedies are obvious. Congress can again
amend the immigration system to take account of the Philippines, a
country "adversely affected" by actions of both the executive and
legislative branches the U.S. government. Filipino veterans who
served in World War II should not only be allowed to naturalize,
they should receive additional procedural protections that ordinary
U.S. citizens do not. They should be allowed to have their sons and
daughters immediately naturalized, regardless of marital status or
age. Additionally, sons and daughters of deceased Filipino veterans
should also be able to naturalize immediately. In order to offset the
unavailability of remedies to deceased veterans without descen-
dants, a set number of additional visas should be granted to the
Philippines on a yearly basis because family preference processing
times for the Philippines are much longer than any other country.
Because the United States occupied the Philippines as a territory and
failed to provide naturalization rights for those veterans who fought
for the United States, a sincere and concerted attempt should be
made to bring Filipino immigration up to date with the rest of the
world.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this paper, Heinlein's notions of citizenship have
been used as a model to examine the treatment of Filipino veterans.
The United States has clearly failed to fulfill its part of the reciprocal
rights/duties citizenship paradigm. On the surface, Starship Troopers
stands for the proposition that anyone willing to die for a country
must be allowed full membership within that country. The United
States has not permitted Filipino veterans naturalization rights de-
spite their courage and valor.
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But Heinlein's deeper message is that political power must be
exercised responsibly. His society is structured so that the only ones
able to vote have proved their responsibility by shouldering the
responsibility of national defense. To Heinlein, political power must
be taken seriously. He describes the power to vote as "the supreme
authority from which all other authority derives ... the [political]
franchise is force, naked and raw, the Power of the Rods and the
Ax."2 7 While this power is great, it is tempered with the responsibil-
ity evinced by the military commitment undertaken by each citizen
This combination ensures that such power will not be abused.
In the United States, our political system adopts safeguards
against abuse through the system of checks and balances. The three
branches of the government work with and against each other to
ensure fairness to citizens. But Filipino veterans find themselves
caught in the nexus of colonial and immigration law-two fields in
which the legislative branch wields ultimate plenary power. The
absence of structural safeguards against abuse both permits and
encourages such manifest injustice. It is apparent that the unchecked
imbalance within the plenary power structure is neither necessary
nor proper. But until plenary power is abolished, Congress needs to
wield their broad power responsibly and enact remedial legislation
that will make Filipino veterans and the Philippines whole after
their valiant sacrifice in World War II.
257. See HEINLEIN, supra note 2, at 183.
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